Despite outlaw image, Hells Angels sue often

Despite outlaw image, Hells Angels sue often

The Dirty Secret of 'Discounts'—Black Friday and Beyond - WSJ.com

The Dirty Secret of 'Discounts'—Black Friday and Beyond - WSJ.com

Popes vs. Jews | FrontPage Magazine

Popes vs. Jews | FrontPage Magazine

Deal Lets Iran Keep Half of 98%-Enriched Uranium Stockpile

Deal Lets Iran Keep Half of 98%-Enriched Uranium Stockpile

If you don’t believe that Iran is close to assembling a nuclear bomb because of the agreement reached by Barack Obama's administration, think again. 

The agreement allows Iran to keep half of the uranium it has already enriched to 20%, and the other half is to be diluted to 5% U-235. As Powerline reports, “It takes about 8 days and only 2% of the total effort to go from the 20% HEU permitted to the 90% required for weapons grade and only 45 days and 10% of the cumulative effort from the 5% level of HEU.”

The reason for this is simple; most of the time required to make highly enriched uranium comes in the early stages. 90% of the effort is expended to reach the 5% level, 98% to reach the 20% level.

An American Enterprise Institute report states:

The work and time required to enrich uranium from its natural concentration (0.7%) to 3.5% low-enriched uranium (LEU) is an order of magnitude greater than that required to enrich 20% LEU to weapons-grade concentrations (90% U-235). That is because centrifuges must spin more than 14,000 kg of uranium ore to produce 1,373 kg of 3.5% LEU, but only 116 kg of 20% LEU to produce 15 kg of weapons-grade uranium.

The Fray - How To Save A Life

Iran Deal: Myths vs. Facts

Iran Deal: Myths vs. Facts

According to the wisest members of the left, including President Obama, the new deal with Iran will stifle Iran’s nuclear program. President Obama pledged, in his Saturday night address to the nation, that “we have halted the progress of the Iranian nuclear program,” and added that “key parts of the program will be rolled back.” On Monday, Obama told a crowd in San Francisco, “We cannot rule out peaceful solutions to the world’s problems. We cannot commit ourselves to an endless cycle of conflict.”

The deal is, according to The New York Times, a no-brainer: “no one can seriously argue that it doesn’t make the world safer.”

The problem is this: the deal that the Obama administration and its allies in the press are presenting to the world is a mythical one. Here, then, are the major deal points, and the flaws in them:

“The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iranˈs nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful.”

Myth: The agreement is a step forward in that it bars Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Fact: The agreement explicitly allows Iran to develop nuclear capabilities in violation of United Nations resolutions, giving Iran the leeway to lie about its use of fissile material.

“From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%. No reconversion line.”

Myth: This rolls back the existing Iranian nuclear weapons program to a significant degree.

Fact: The difference between 20% enrichment and 5% enrichment is relatively minute. There is no verification mechanism to ensure that the watered-down stuff is not reconverted.

“Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months. Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (1), Fordow (2), or the Arak reactor (3), designated by the IAEA as IR-40.”

Myth: This significantly hampers Iran’s nuclear development capabilities.

Fact: Not only does the agreement’s verification provide only weak checks on facilities the west knows about, it completely ignores the Parchin facility near Tehran.

“Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iranˈs plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures.”

Myth: This gives the west brand new information about Iranian nuclear facilities.

Fact: This gives the Iranians three months to fabricate information about their nuclear facilities.

“Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.”

Myth: This is serious surveillance.

Fact: This is deeply unserious surveillance. Inspectors may not show up unnaounced to check out design information, physical inventory, or interim inventory. Unannounced inspections are only allowed under the agreement “for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records” at two of the nuclear reactors, but not at Arak or Parchin at all. The most important type of nuclear verification is monitored by the Iranian government, including “managed access” to centrifuge assembly, uranium mines and mills, and centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities. In other words, all the important information gets filtered by the Iranian government.

The rest of the agreement constitutes goodies the west will give to Iran, including “No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions,” “No new EU nuclear-related sanctions,” and suspension of US and EU sanctions on “gold and precious metals,” as well as Iranian petrochemical exports.

There are multiple other problems with the Iran deal text, including the fact that Iran is allowed to continue centrifuge production, supposedly to “replace damaged machines” – but, as mentioned, inspection of centrifuges is monitored by the Iranian government under “managed access.” So Iran’s centrifuge production can continue wholesale under the guise of replacing damaged materials no one can inspect.

It is no wonder the Iranian government is so thrilled with this deal. They gave up virtually nothing, and gained six months during which Israel is completely isolated internationally – a period during which they can speed along their path toward a nuclear weapon. And anyone who thinks President Obama is humble enough to declare this deal a failure in six months, no matter how much of a failure it is, has never seen this egotistical Commander-in-Chief in action.

Ben Shapiro is Editor-At-Large of Breitbart News and author of the New York Times bestseller “Bullies: How the Left’s Culture of Fear and Intimidation Silences America” (Threshold Editions, January 8, 2013). He is also Editor-in-Chief ofTruthRevolt.org. Follow Ben Shapiro on Twitter @benshapiro.

Our world: The goal of Obama’s foreign policy

Our world: The goal of Obama’s foreign policy

Author: Iran Deal 'Makes an Israeli Strike Inevitable'

Author: Iran Deal 'Makes an Israeli Strike Inevitable'

"I think it's a betrayal. The Obama administration had to be dragged into supporting sanctions. It took the administration three years to sign up for crippling sanctions. And now, just as they're starting to work, the administration is beginning to dismantle the system. That's a betrayal. 

"The are laying the groundwork for another North Korea. One way or another, they are going to reach the finish line. They're either going to do it through subterfuge, or by pocketing the gains from this deal and then not moving forward to the final status agreement and then daring the international community not to implement the sanctions. The hard part is creating the network of sanctions. The easy part is dismantling them.

"Before this deal, there were two credible threats to a nuclear Iran. One was the sanctions effort, and the other was a Israeli strike. The deal with Iran undercuts both. If israel doesn't strike, Iran will go nuclear. And the price of an Israeli strike has now has risen exponentially.

I asked Halevi about Jeffrey Goldberg's conclusion that the deal was the "least-worst thing that could have happened."

"If you're going to make a deal, this is the best deal they could make. But there should not have been a deal. The Iranian regime was being cornered. Sanctions might even have brought about the fall of the regime. This is an unthinkable surrender.

"Obama has created a condition in which Iran will be gradually reaccepted into the international community, and Israel could well find itself a pariah. That's Obama's gift to the Jewish people.

"I think this deal makes an Israeli strike inevitable."

Joan Nathan's Chosen Food: The Ultimate Sufganiyot

The Iran nuclear deal: full text - CNN.com

The Iran nuclear deal: full text - CNN.com

Joint Plan of Action

Preamble

The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iranˈs nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iranˈs nuclear program.

There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Councilˈs consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.

Elements of a first step

The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.

Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:

* From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%. No reconversion line.

* Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.

* Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (1), Fordow (2), or the Arak reactor (3), designated by the IAEA as IR-40.

* Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.

* No new locations for the enrichment.

* Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.

* No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

* Enhanced monitoring:

- Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iranˈs plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures.

- Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40, to the IAEA.

- Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.

- Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.

- IAEA inspector managed access to:

. centrifuge assembly workshops4;

. centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and,

. uranium mines and mills.

In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:

- Pause efforts to further reduce Iranˈs crude oil sales, enabling Iranˈs current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.

- Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:

. Iranˈs petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services. (5)

. Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.

• Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iranˈs auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services.

• License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well as associated services. (6)

• No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.

• No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.

• The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.

• Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iranˈs domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel.

* This channel could also enable:

a- transactions required to pay Iranˈs UN obligations; and,

b- direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.

• Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount.

Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution*

The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:

• Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.

• Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.

• Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon.

• Involve a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.

• Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40. No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

• Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).

• Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Footnotes)

(1) Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

(2) At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

(3) Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components.

(4) Consistent with its plans, Iranˈs centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines.

(5) ˈSanctions on associated servicesˈ means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.

(6) Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.

* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that ˈnothing is agreed until everything is agreedˈ applies.ˈ

The Pace of Technology Adoption is Speeding Up - Rita McGrath - Harvard Business Review

The Pace of Technology Adoption is Speeding Up - Rita McGrath - Harvard Business Review

Review & Outlook: Iran's Nuclear Triumph - WSJ.com

Review & Outlook: Iran's Nuclear Triumph - WSJ.com

Iran's Nuclear Triumph

Tehran can continue to enrich uranium at 10,000 working centrifuges.

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Updated Nov. 24, 2013 10:18 p.m. ET

President Obama is hailing a weekend accord that he says has "halted the progress of the Iranian nuclear program," and we devoutly wish this were true. The reality is that the agreement in Geneva with five Western nations takes Iran a giant step closer to becoming a de facto nuclear power.

Start with the fact that this "interim" accord fails to meet the terms of several United Nations resolutions, which specify no sanctions relief until Iran suspends all uranium enrichment. Under this deal Iran gets sanctions relief, but it does not have to give up its centrifuges that enrich uranium, does not have to stop enriching, does not have to transfer control of its enrichment stockpiles, and does not have to shut down its plutonium reactor at Arak.

Enlarge Image

Iran nuclear talks at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, Sunday, Nov. 24, 2013. Associated Press

Mr. Obama's weekend statement glossed over these canyon-sized holes. He said Iran "cannot install or start up new centrifuges," but it already has about 10,000 operational centrifuges that it can continue to spin for at least another six months. Why does Tehran need so many centrifuges if not to make a bomb at the time it pleases?

The President also said that "Iran has committed to halting certain levels of enrichment and neutralizing part of its stockpiles." He is referring to an Iranian pledge to oxidize its 20% enriched uranium stockpile. But this too is less than reassuring because the process can be reversed and Iran retains a capability to enrich to 5%, which used to be a threshold we didn't accept because it can easily be reconverted to 20%.

Mr. Obama said "Iran will halt work at its plutonium reactor," but Iran has only promised not to fuel the reactor even as it can continue other work at the site. That is far from dismantling what is nothing more than a bomb factory. North Korea made similar promises in a similar deal with Condoleezza Rice during the final Bush years, but it quickly returned to bomb-making.

As for inspections, Mr. Obama hailed "extensive access" that will "allow the international community to verify whether Iran is keeping its commitments." One problem is that Iran hasn't ratified the additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency agreement that would allow inspections on demand at such sites as Parchin, which remain off limits. Iran can also oust U.N. inspectors at any time, much as North Korea did.

Then there is the sanctions relief, which Mr. Obama says is only "modest" but which reverses years of U.S. diplomacy to tighten and enforce them. The message is that the sanctions era is over. The loosening of the oil regime is especially pernicious, inviting China, India and Germany to get back to business with Iran.

We are told that all of these issues will be negotiated as part of a "final" accord in the next six months, but that is not how arms control works. It is far more likely that this accord will set a precedent for a series of temporary deals in which the West will gradually ease more sanctions in return for fewer Iranian concessions.

Iran will threaten to walk away from the talks without new concessions, and Mr. Obama will not want to acknowledge that his diplomatic achievement wasn't real. The history of arms control is that once it is underway the process dominates over substance, and a Western leader who calls a halt is denounced for risking war. The negotiating advantage lies with the dictatorship that can ignore domestic opinion.

Mr. Obama all but admitted this himself by noting that "only diplomacy can bring about a durable solution to the challenge posed by Iran's nuclear program." He added that "I have a profound responsibility to try to resolve our differences peacefully, rather than rush towards conflict." Rush to conflict? Iran's covert nuclear program was uncovered a decade ago, and the West has been desperately trying to avoid military action.

The best that can be said is that the weekend deal slows for a few weeks Iran's rapid progress to a nuclear breakout. But the price is that at best it sets a standard that will allow Iran to become a nuclear-capable regime that stops just short of exploding a bomb. At worst, it will allow Iran to continue to cheat and explode a bomb whenever it is strategically convenient to serve its goal of dominating the Middle East.

This seems to be the conclusion in Tehran, where Foreign Minister Javad Zarif boasted that the deal recognizes Iran's right to enrich uranium while taking the threat of Western military action off the table. Grand Ayatollah Ali Khameini also vouchsafed his approval, only days after he denounced the U.S. and called Jews "rabid dogs."

Israel has a different view of the deal, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calling it a "historic mistake." He and his cabinet will now have to make their own calculations about the risks of unilateral military action. Far from having Israel's back, as Mr. Obama likes to say, the U.S. and Europe are moving to a strategy of trying to contain Israel rather than containing Iran. The French also fell into line as we feared they would under U.S. and media pressure.

***

Mr. Obama seems determined to press ahead with an Iran deal regardless of the details or damage. He views it as a legacy project. A President has enormous leeway on foreign policy, but Congress can signal its bipartisan unhappiness by moving ahead as soon as possible to strengthen sanctions. Mr. Obama warned Congress not to do so in his weekend remarks, but it is the only way now to stop the President from accommodating a nuclear Iran.

PLA Air Force conducts first patrol in new air defense zone｜Politics｜News｜WantChinaTimes.com

PLA Air Force conducts first patrol in new air defense zone｜Politics｜News｜WantChinaTimes.com

A pro-terror rally on a Palestinian campus

A pro-terror rally on a Palestinian campus

by Jeff Jacoby
The Boston Globe
November 24, 2013

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Supporters of the Palestinian terrorist organization Islamic Jihad stage a rally on the main campus of Al-Quds University, Nov. 5, 2013. (Photo: Tom Gross Media)

THEY WEREN'T wearing swastika armbands or chanting "Sieg Heil!" during the Islamic Jihad rally this month on the campus of Al-Quds University. They didn't need to. Everything about the event reeked of fascism and anti-Semitic bloodlust. Demonstrators at the Palestinian school paraded in paramilitary gear, with massed black flags, mock assault weapons, and arms extended in Nazi-style salutes. There were banners lionizing suicide bombers, and hand-drawn Israeli flags on which students trod. Islamic Jihad — long identified as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union — posted photos of the rally on its website. In one, students representing dead Israelis sprawl on the ground as black-clad jihadists brandishing weapons stride past.

Such celebrations of terrorism and incitement to violence are pervasive in Palestinian society. Children raised under the Palestinian Authority are indoctrinated from an early age to regard Israelis and Jews as enemies to be destroyed and infidels to be loathed. Nothing about the nearly three-hour rally at Al-Quds would likely have surprised the estimated 1,000 students who saw it. Most of them have been fed a steady diet of such poison all their lives, and not just in schools and mosques. From TV shows and popular music to the naming ofsports clubs and public squares, the next generation of Palestinians has grown up amid the most violent culture of Jew-hatred since the Third Reich.

Alisa Flatow, a Brandeis student, died in a terror bombing in 1995.

A fog of political correctness usually keeps events like the Al-Quds rally from getting much attention in the Western media. But this one, first reported by veteran British journalist Tom Gross, made news last week when it led Brandeis University into suspending a longstanding academic partnership with the Palestinian school. It wasn't the grotesque rally itself that provoked Brandeis to pull the plug, though that should have been sufficient: One of Islamic Jihad's many innocent victims was a 20-year-old Brandeis undergraduate, Alisa Flatow, who was one of eight people murdered in 1995 when an Islamic Jihad bomber blew up the bus in which they were riding.

What finally forced the issue was the refusal of Sari Nusseibeh, the president of Al-Quds and a well-known Palestinian intellectual, to condemn the hate-drenched rally even after being asked to do so by Brandeis president Frederick Lawrence. Nusseibeh replied instead with an outrageous letter that denounced "vilification campaigns by Jewish extremists," and suggested their only purpose in raising the issue was to "prevent Palestinians from achieving our freedom."

Nusseibeh is often described as a Palestinian "moderate." But in a culture as poisoned with vitriolic anti-Semitism as the Palestinian Authority, moderation doesn't go very far. It doesn't even go as far as repudiating the Nazi-like salutes and tableaux of dead Israelis during a public rally on an East Jerusalem college campus. Not even to retain the goodwill of an institution as dovish and liberal as Brandeis, a Jewish-sponsored university that was proud of its relationship with Al-Quds.

The genocidal values of Islamic Jihad are no anomaly.

Haj Amin al-Husseini, leader of the Palestinian Arabs, meets with Adolf Hitler in November 1941. The Arabs were Nazi Germany's "natural friends," Husseini assured the führer, "because they had the same enemies" – namely, the Jews.

They are the values of Hamas and the PLO. They are the values that led the Arab League to spurn the UN's proposed two-state solution in 1947, and to announce that it would crush the newborn Jewish state in "a war of extermination and a momentous massacre." They are the values that induced Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the leader of the Palestinians in the 1930s, to form an alliance with Adolf Hitler, eagerly collaborating with the führer in the hope of importing the Final Solution to the Jews of the Middle East.

"Our fundamental condition for cooperating with Germany," Husseini wrote in his journal, "was a free hand to eradicate every last Jew from Palestine and the Arab world." He asked Hitler "for an explicit undertaking to allow us to solve the Jewish problem … according to the scientific methods innovated by Germany in the handling of its Jews."

There may have been no actual swastikas at the Islamic Jihad rally, but the lethal values represented by the swastika have been a part of the Palestinian national movement for the better part of a century. They still are, however much people of goodwill might wish otherwise. So long as even famous Palestinian "moderates" cannot bring themselves to bravely defy those values, Palestinian sovereignty will remain a reckless gamble — and peace as far off as ever.

(Jeff Jacoby is a columnist for The Boston Globe).

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